The paper explores the idea that the influence of special interest groupsespecially firms -on elections may have positive economic effects. This is the case when contributions tend to restraint the scope of opportunism by the governing party that may, in general, renege on its promises for economic stability and choose excessively leftist policies. This is prevented if the private sector in the political game gets to move after the policy is chosen, contributing to the governing party or to its rivals. Anticipating this, the governing party will choose not to follow policies that will harm strong corporate groups.
INTRODUCTION
Why do campaign contributions by special interests exist? Do they serve any social purpose or they just serve the interests of powerful groups that impose them on a society that dislikes them? If this institution contributes to social efficiency by helping enforce policy rules and promises then its existence can be economically rationalized. This paper attempts to examine a novel channel through which contributions may affect economic efficiency. Contributions may serve as a commitment devise that helps keep control over the expectations of the private sector about economic policy, especially with respect to important macroeconomic indices. The basic argument of this paper is that society as a whole may benefit from this institution if it helps solve dynamic inconsistency problems and induce investments
In the recent years the role of campaign contributions has been extensively discussed in the United States and many types of campaign finance reform have been proposed.
Political scientists, economists and other social scientists have been examining the economic and social effects of campaign contributions. For example, Levitt (1995) refers to three main criticisms of the system of congressional campaign finance in the United
States at that time. Firstly, fundraising is an important activity for candidates that requires too many resources, especially in terms of the time constraints of politicians, hence they may not been able to carry out their more important tasks. Second, it is argued that the system of contributions and fundraising may be biased towards incumbents. Thirdly, an important consideration is whether organized interest groups exert excessive influence on politics. To these arguments one may add that the system is may be biased towards rightwing candidates, since the majority of special interest groups are thought to relate to the corporate sector.
Intimately connected with these issues are considerations about the relationship between regulated private campaign contributions, as an institution, and economic efficiency. For example, an additional criticism asserts that increasing campaign money, after some level of expenditure has been made, has no important effect on social welfare; therefore there is a waste of resources. The literature on the efficiency of the institution of private contributions has been increasing because of the large pressures for legislative change in the US, informed by the idea that money plays an excessively large role in American politics. In addition to the many objections to private campaign contributions, some advantages have been proposed. In particular, it has been argued that contributions may inform voters about the quality of candidates or their exact positions in the political spectrum. This can be done with two ways: either political advertising is directly informative of the qualities of politicians 1 , or it signals a hidden ability of a candidate that the voters do not observe but the interest groups do 2 . This is welfare-increasing if the choice of the better candidate is induced. But the arguments of the first type do not the 1 The papers by Austen-Smith (1987) and Coate (2001) are representative of this literature. 2 See Prat (1999) .
basic question namely, why society tolerates special interest contributions, because the perceived benefits of information come from campaigning in general. Hence, it may be argued that generous public funding of campaigning is the optimal solution, since this will allow for the benefits of informational advertising without the perceived negative effect of shifting policies in favor of the interest groups that finance theses campaigns.
However, arguments of the signaling literature, and in particular the campaign advertisement-signaling model developed by Prat, do offer a rationale for the existence of private contributions.
In part two the concept of "mechanisms of commitment" is introduced and the relationship between our model and the existing literature is discussed. In part three the setting of the formal model is introduced. The equilibrium of the model is discussed in part four. In part five the equilibrium is compared to the one in the model is extended with an explicit commitment possibility. Part six discusses the assumptions and the results of the model and its extensions. Part seven concludes.
MECHANISMS OF COMMITMENT AND RELATED LITERATURE.
In their famous paper, "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal
Plans" (1977) Kydland and Prescott underline the importance of policy rules that are unalienable except under very extreme conditions. This importance stems from the wellknown problem of time inconsistency that occurs if policy-making is a dynamic process.
If the optimal current decisions of agents depend on future policy choices of the policymaker then the so-called consistent policy may not be the optimal one. (The consistent policy maximizes expected social welfare at any point in time taking into account the future effects of policy). If this idea is true in real economic policy, then policy rules and commitment are important. Hence, one may be interested examining those specific institutions that ensure that policy rules are enforced 3 . One very important example of such an institution is the independent central bank with a "conservative director". If monetary policy is out of the control of politicians then this may reduce expected inflation because the conservative director earns no benefit by causing unexpected inflation.
In this paper attention will be focused mainly on policies affecting the returns to capital and possible commitments referring to these policies. In particular, the objective is to examine an institution that may ensure that policy rules (for example, pertaining to capital taxation) will not be violated or circumvented by opportunistic policymakers. This institution is a legal framework allowing for corporate campaign contributions. In the existence of this institution, if policymakers choose opportunistic policies they are penalized by significantly undermining his party's reelection prospects 4 . Furthermore, it is important that society, as a whole, including people who earn mostly labor income, may benefit from the establishment of this institution. This is despite the fact that the resulting corporate influence in elections may militate against the choice of a labor-friendly policy. The reason is that in the long run they will benefit enough from the higher level of investments in the economy, which is attained by enforcing the commitment to a more capital-friendly policy.
This paradox resembles the one of strategic delegation, which is discussed in Person and Tabellini (1994) . This notion refers to the electoral support by some voters of candidates that may not share their preferences about policy. This can be the case when, for example, the elections cannot be won by candidates that share the preferences of these voters. A related model with similarities with our model is presented in Person and Tabellini (1994) pp. 318-323 . This is a model with Citizen-Candidates, that is, where candidates themselves are affected by the policy they choose. Here, middle-income voters may vote for candidates that would protect the profitability of capital more than they themselves would like to. This is because after elections take place, capital accumulation decisions are made on the basis of predictions about future policy, enacted in stage three. These decisions affect the welfare of all, as in our model. Thus, Person and Tabellini also view this seemingly paradoxical mechanism as enforcing the society's commitment on policies that induce capital investments.
The notion that wage earners may like an institution that protects the rights of capital has been examined in the political science literature. This is closely related with the idea of "structural dependence" of democratic governments on capital. This view claims that the policy-making of a modern democratic state is structurally constrained; this is because investment decisions of wealth holders affect the future economic conditions for the economy as a whole 5 . Therefore governments have to take into account of the effect of their policies on investments and growth and voters realize this. Przeworsky and Wallerstein (1988) introduce and test the idea of structural dependence using a formal model. They show that without effective government intervention the wage earners are constrained in their demands. They also show how a tax on consumption of profit-earners can relax this constraint, invalidating "structural dependence". Yet, in the dynamic setting, where expectations matter, governments are constrained for the usual reasons of credibility of promises for capital accumulation. This last conclusion is very similar to the results of "equilibrium with no commitment" here. However, the authors do not discuss any particular institutions that may result from the problem of "structural dependence".
The literature on campaign contributions is also large. In terms of its structure, our model has similarities with the model of Snyder and Ting (2005) . They also use a model with voters (a representative voter) interest groups and parties to examine the importance of elections as a means to control the performance of politicians. However, their focus is mainly in comparing the incentive to control performance versus the incentive to elect good types of politicians. It is interesting to note that they use an alternative assumption regarding the effect of a contribution or "a bribe". A "bribe" from the interest group directly increases the utility of the party, whereas in our model it only affects the probabilities of reelection.
5 See Przeworsky and Wallerstein, (1988 Hence, this model derives a rationalization of the institution of campaign contributions by special interest groups, unlike the directly informative advertising models. Our model also offers a natural explanation for this institution in terms of efficiency.
THE SETTING OF THE MODEL
The main ideas are analyzed in a simple model with investment decisions, policy choices and elections. We show that if corporate campaign contributions are not institutionalized -in which case they are illegal and we assume they do not exist -then the time inconsistency problem makes the incumbent party choose a labor-friendly policy. This is because a very large portion of the constituency belongs to the group of wage earners and prefers such a policy. Anticipating this, firms do not invest and all are worse off. If the government could commit to the capital-friendly policy this would improve social welfare but without legal campaign contributions the enforcement of this commitment is not possible. Consequently, voters accept the existence of this institution because it makes them better off.
The Players and the Pure Strategy Spaces
There are two parties, an incumbent party ( I ) and a challenger party ( ). There are two groups of voters, the middle class ( C M ) and the rich class ( R ), each of which has a continuum of voters. Finally, there is the firm sector ( ). Player C , the challenger party, never gets to move in our model but is used for expositional reasons. voters' choice and the firms' choice at the previous stages, the pure-strategy space for the incumbent party is the set of all mappings of the form
In stage three, elections take place and voters decide if they vote for the incumbent or the challenger party. Notice that as will be explained later, voters differ within each group and among groups. So any pure strategy equilibrium must specify a pure strategy for each voter of the two groups. Accordingly, the pure strategy space of voter j is the space of all mappings of the form { } { } { } { }
: , , , ,
All equilibria we will find are pure strategy equilibria.
The Payoff Functions
Firms: the payoffs of firms are their profits, realized in stage two. They depend on whether they invested or not and on the policy choice of the incumbent party. Let ) , ( x s π be the profit function of firms. The critical property of this function is the following:
This says that if the policy is labor-friendly the firm sector is better off having invested low and if the policy is capital-friendly the opposite is true. This seems reasonable given that investments entail some fixed costs and increase productive capacity. The function π incorporates these costs here. If the variable costs of production are high enough, then the optimal choice of the firm sector is not to produce a large quantity. Thus, fixed costs cannot be covered and the firm is making loses. It is a logical assumption that variable costs depend on minimum wages, insurance regulations, capital taxation and more parameters that are incorporated in the policies E and . L Parties: the payoff of the two parties is a fixed amount Ω that they get if they are elected in stage three. They get zero if they are not elected. We assume that the utility from choosing any level of policy in stage two is zero. In other words, parties have no preference for any particular policy. This assumption is not necessary for the results.
Voters: the payoffs for voters are different between groups as well as within groups. They are additive and they depend on which of the two parties gets elected.
For agent j in the middle-class group, the utility function is:
For agent k in the rich group, the utility function is: Let's now explain in detail what these different terms mean and their important properties.
First of all, the utility for the middle class voters depends on current policy and investment according to the payoff function and the corresponding function of rich class voters is . The important thing here is that this term does not depend on who gets elected: it is simply the realized payoff in stage two. This term therefore does not affect the elections but it does affect the welfare properties of equilibria.
This says that that for all voters the situation where investment is high is preferable that the one where investment is low regardless of the policy chosen. This means that even middle income voters would be better of in a thriving economy with capital-friendly policy than in a shrinking economy with a labor-friendly policy. This is reasonable if we 6 This is justified if we consider the effect of the general economic conditions in the popularity of incumbents according to the models of retrospective voting. There is much evidence that shows that voters punish the incumbent party both for bad macroeconomic performance and individual low income in a retrospective manner: see Kramer (1971) and the surveys by Monroe (1979) and by Kiewiet and Rivers (1984) .
consider the evidence in many countries where excessively leftist policies have the average worker worse off by discouraging investments.
The functions ( ), , i p s i M R = capture the fact that voters seek to discipline the incumbent party for policies that affect their individual economic condition. For simplicity we assume that:
This simply says that the middle group voters have an incentive to reward the incumbent for choosing labor-friendly policy that improves their economic well-being, and the rich group voters to reward the opposite policy. The symmetry assumption is only for convenience. The function reflects the tendency of all voters to reward the incumbent for achieving general prosperity in the economy. Again for simplicity, we assume that
The importance of jM σ , kR σ is in capturing individual heterogeneity . Voter has a specific individual preference for one of the two parties that does not depend on the expected policy of the two parties. This might be due to ideological preference or due to preference over a policy of the two parties that is fixed. This preference is represented by the individual parameter The reason for this difference is that one social group may be more ideologically homogeneous that the other, and jM σ , kR σ are the ideological homogeneity parameter.
The use of these parameters helps smooth the results and to understand the importance of ideological homogeneity. Finally, the random parameterδ (remember that it represents the general popularity of the incumbent party relative to the challenger party) follows the
The realization of δ can be affected by random elements of the political process, such as performance the final debate between the political leaders.
The Institution of Campaign Contributions
To capture this institution without complicating the analysis too much, assume that the firm sector can finance the campaign of the incumbent or the challenger party -a decision that depends on the policy choice of the incumbent party. What the firm sector wants is the choice of policy in stage two. Thus, it is safe to assume that the firms convey the message to the incumbent party that if it chooses a policy they will contribute to party and if it chooses policy they will contribute to
To provide this kind of incentives is a weakly dominant strategy for , but we shall not discuss the F choice of the optimum contribution scheme here 8 . For simplicity, assume the aggregate popularity of the incumbent increases in a well-defined way with contribution money and this is the same for both groups of voters.
In particular, campaign contributions means a fixed monetary amount to the campaign of the party to which they are given, and they have the psychological effect of adding a fixed amount to the utility of all voters if the supported party gets elected. This is, for example, because they are used for persuasive television advertising, and thus they create a positive impression for this party. What is required is that the contributions have a substantial effect on the utility of voters, c 8 An important question is: why would the interest group honor its promise and pay the contribution after the policy has been chosen? An answer can be given if we interpret the group F as a long-run player, who is interested for reputation building, and the politicians as short-run players, for example because each politician is elected for only two terms.
meaning, for example, that advertising is very persuasive. We will discuss the plausibility of this assumption later. 
THE COMMITMENT OUTCOME
Illustrating the main ideas, we shall first briefly consider the game in stages one to three only, without the possibility of campaign contributions. This is in order to show that that the theoretical argument about policy rules is valid in this case, but its enforcement is not trivial. Assume that commitment to a certain policy is costless. We want to examine whether, in this game, the incumbent party would be better off in the equilibrium with discretion or committing about the policy it will follow in stage two before the investment decision in stage one would improve its position.
Claim: under assumptions one, three and five, if the incumbent party commits to follow the employer-friendly policy in stage two it improves its position relative to the case where it does not commit. If assumption two additionally holds, then everybody is better of in this commitment equilibrium.
Proof: Proposition one in section five describes the equilibrium without commitment in this game. Using its results, we know that the equilibrium payoffs with discretion are the equilibrium probability of the incumbent party winning, that is: This is a typical result that affirms that rules are better that discretion, especially when it comes to capital taxation. The important issue here is how to achieve this result, or at least approximate it with some cost, when a direct contract stipulating the commitment arrangement is prohibited by law and any agreement is likely to bear the negative suspicions of corruption. As the theorem shows, campaign contributions are likely to approach this outcome, without avoiding the later suspicions though.
EQUILIBRIUM WHEN DIRECT COMMITMENT IS NOT POSSIBLE
Theorem: In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game all voters vote to allow for the institution of campaign contributions. The equilibrium strategies for all players are:
1. The choice of from all voters is in stage zero. a 2. The strategy of in stage one is hl (firms invest only if the institution has been approved). 
The policy function of I in stage two is the following: ( , ) , ( , ) f a h E f a l E
To prove this result we shall prove two propositions about the equilibria in the two subgames that start at stage one.
Proposition 1:
In the subgame where the voters reject the institution of campaign contribution at stage zero, and under assumptions one and three, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and the following pure strategies are equilibrium strategies for , F I :
• for at stage one, l F
• for the incumbent party at stage two (the incumbent chooses a labor-friendly policy no matter the investment choice of the firms).
LL
Proof: Backward induction will be used. We shall start by considering the voting behavior at stage three. The problem of voter j in group M is trivial. She votes for I if the utility from doing so is greater that the utility from voting for C . Then, the share of votes over the whole population that party I gets is
Since δ is still random, what the incumbent wants is to maximize his probability of winning. This is equal to the probability that his share of total votes Π exceeds 1 2 .
But given the distribution of the parameterδ , the probability that it exceeds a given number c is 1 2 cθ − . Finally, the probability of the incumbent winning given already chosen is the following:
Now, at stage two, the incumbent party anticipates this behavior of voters and chooses the policy that maximizes maximize its utility. Since its utility depends only on the result of the elections, it simply seeks to make its probability of being elected. It is worth noting that a this stage the investment decision has already been taken and therefore the incumbent party knows it cannot affect it. If it chooses policy , its probability of
If it chooses policy E , its probability of winning is
Therefore, the incumbent party chooses the labor-friendly policy if
By assumption three, this holds. Furthermore, note that the policy choice does not depend on the investment level x . When the policy is considered, investment decisions are already made, and although they can make the incumbent party more popular, they cannot affect its optimal decision. We conclude that the optimal strategy for I is , that is, choosing a labor-friendly policy no matter what.
This result is intuitive: the labor-friendly policy politically benefits the incumbent party if the political clout of the middle-income group, net of the possibility of contributions, is higher that the respective political clout of the rich group. This is what assumption two maintains. The political clout of a group is determined by the intensity of the desire of voters in this group to punish capital-friendly or labor-friendly policy, (for the middle and the rich group respectively), weighted by the size and the ideological homogeneity of that group.
The firms rationally anticipate this so they invest low in stage one, since assumption one implies that they would reduce their profits if they invested high. So the optimal strategy for is l . In a similar argument like in Kynland and Prescott, the government, in the F absence of commitment, loses any control over the expectations of the firm sector, which
That completes the proof of proposition 1.
Proposition 2: under assumptions one, three and four there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the subgame where the institution of legal contributions is approved at stage zero, and the following pure strategies are equilibrium strategies for , F I :
• For at stage one,
• For the incumbent party at stage two, EE
Proof:
Again, backward induction is used. In this setting, the preferences of voters in stage three depend on the policy for one additional reason: choosing s E = implies that contribute to the campaign of the incumbent, and 
For agent k in the rich group, the utility function is: It is readily verifiable that now the probability of I winning is
, then for agent j in the middle-class group, the utility function is: For agent k in the rich group, the utility function is: It is readily verifiable that now the probability of I winning is
Again, the incumbent party, anticipating the behavior of voters in stage three and hence these probabilities, will follow the employer friendly policy if
This holds by assumption four, which assumed that the effect of campaign contributions is important for persuading voters (this important assumption is discussed later). Thus, the incumbent party, under this contribution schedule of the firm sector, maximizes its reelection probabilities if it chooses the employer-friendly policy in stage two. Once again, the optimal strategy of party I does not depend on whether investments took place or not in stage one. We conclude that under legal campaign contributions the optimal strategy for the incumbent party in stage two is . Finally, rationally anticipating this, the firm sector shall invest in stage one. This completes the proof of proposition 2.
EE
The last two parts of the theorem have already been proven. To prove part one, notice that the equilibrium payoffs of all voters in stage two in the subgame with contributions is and in the subgame without contributions it is
. From assumption two, so all voters are better off if they approve the institution of campaign contributions in stage zero. Assumption two therefore is the most important assumption for campaign contributions to be welfare improving. As we shall discuss, this is not as stringent an assumption as it may seem.
This proves the theorem.
Readers have probably noticed that the term does not play any role in equilibrium.
This emphasizes the point in this paper: that even if everybody, including the incumbent ) (x g party, were better if this party committed to follow the employer-friendly policy, this would simply not be possible without the presence of a guaranteeing institution.
DISCUSSION
The fact that the model does not have repeated interaction between the players, such as an infinite horizon model, brings important limitations. First of all, it cannot incorporate the incentives of voters to select good types of politicians but only the incentive to discipline the performance of candidates. Secondly, it cannot examine the importance of reputation building for achieving the commitment outcome. In this sense, the existence of the institution of contributions can be viewed as an efficient condition for attaining this outcome, not a necessary one, since an extension of the model may reveal other commitment equilibria.
It is important to examine under which conditions the results of the model are relevant for an economy. Assumption three requires that the "political clout" of the middle group in the absence of campaign contributions is greater than the "political clout" of the rich group. Whereas the assumption of a greater size for the middle-income group is hardly disputable (so that is a realistic assumption), many political scientists assume that the middle-income group is less ideologically homogeneous that the rich group, and as a result Assumption four should also be discussed. There is an important debate in political science regarding the importance of money in politics. Many authors like and Snyder, Ansolabehere and Figueiredo (2003) argue that money is not that important in politics.
Their basic argument is that the money spent on campaign contributions are dwarfed by the money that is at stake when economic policy is decided. At the same time, the legal constraints on maximum contributions are not even binding. If money buys such influence in policymaking decisions as it is argued, then the later fact is inconceivable, given what is to be gained. They conclude that money cannot buy that much influence. If the claim that money does not have a strong influence in politics is true, then cannot be very large unless is unrealistically large.
) (c e c
However, it should be noted that the idea of Snyder, Ansolabehere and Figueiredo is contrary to conventional wisdom, which is the notion that money buys important influence. This conventional wisdom is so strong that Gary Becker, in his influential work (1983), did not include voting at all. He justifies this by the following: "I too claim to have presented a theory of rational political behavior, yet have hardly mentioned voting. This neglect is not accidental because I believe that voter preferences are frequently not a crucial, independent force in political behavior. These 'preferences' can be manipulated and created through the information and misinformation provided by interested pressure groups[…]".(The emphasis is by the author). This is just an example of the conviction that most people and scholars share, that is, that interest groups have very strong effects on voting. In addition to all these we should consider the debate about whether campaign advertisement is informative of persuasive. Assumption four seems particularly plausible if the second view is true since it seems to reinforce Becker's argument about the manipulation of voters' preferences.
Assumption two is not important for the argument that campaign contributions can affect the economic policy, pushing in the direction of employer-friendly policy. However, the argument that the institution of legal campaign contributions is beneficial for society as a whole depends on this assumption. In this sense, the whole argument of this paper that campaign contributions can serve a positive economic role under some circumstances is based on this assumption. This assumption does not require that all people have the same utility with respect to the policies chosen and the investment level. It may well be the case that rich voters prefer the employer friendly policy and middle-income voters prefer the labor-friendly policy. In other words, for every
x is compatible with assumption two.
The assumption of non-partisan politicians is not very important here. The results of the model would not change if you had a left-wing candidate and a right-wing candidate. In such a case, the two candidates have a strong incentive to follow their preferences no matter what they have promised. We briefly sketch a model with partisan politicians but with slightly changed timing. In this setting, like in the previous one, the firm sector decides whether to invest or not in stage one. However, elections take place in stage two and the winner implements the policy in stage three. The two parties here have different preferences: they do not care about the result of the election per se, but for the policy chosen. Party I prefers the labor-friendly policy, whereas party C prefers the employerfriendly policy. More formally, and U . These preferences
are common knowledge. Clearly, parties do care about being elected since this will allow them to implement their policy vs. the other.
The equilibrium without campaign contributions will be driven by the fact that each party has a dominant strategy to choose its favorite policy after it gets elected. Knowing this, the voters will anticipate policy from party L I and policy E from party . The greater political clout of the middle group, by assumption three, will therefore lead to the election of party C I , so policy will be chosen. Anticipating this, the firm sector does not invest in stage one.
L
However, if before elections the firm sector can contribute to its favorite candidate, it is clear that it will contribute to the conservative party knowing that upon victory this party will choose policy E . With contributions, the right-wing candidate's popularity would increase and he would win the elections by assumption four. Thus, the firm sector would invest in stage one. Again, all will be better off in this equilibrium relative to the equilibrium without campaign contributions. This is a case where strategic delegation makes sense. Person and Tabellini (1994) convincingly argue that voters would like to convince firms that they will vote for the right-wing candidate, but this statement is not credible, since at the moment of voting the investment decision already has been made. In this sense our model explains how "indirect strategic delegation" works. Voters would like to commit on voting the right-wing candidate but they cannot do so. Campaign contributions help this strategic delegation be achieved.
A major issue is for what types of democracies the results in this paper are likely to apply, and thus the insights from our model instructive. The existence of problems of time inconsistency, especially with respect to capital taxation and macroeconomic stability, seems to warrant commitment solutions. Hence, countries with strong leftist parties and a tradition of populist governance are more likely to use devices such as the one described in this paper for promoting investments. It may seem that the institution of private campaign contribution can serve as tool that promotes growth in such cases. This does not mean that countries should blindly accept unlimited special interest influence (see next part). Finally, it is worth noting that our model has something to say even for countries that do not seem to have a current policy credibility problem, such as the United
States. In particular, it may explain why this institution emerged in the first place. The historic circumstances where this happened may well be similar with the contemporary conditions in countries that need commitment.
CONCLUSIONS
We used a model to examine how the institutionalization of legal corporate campaign contributions can ameliorate the credibility problem in economic policy and achieve something close to the commitment outcome (at some cost). We concluded that this could be achieved under some assumptions regarding the relative political strength of voter groups and the importance of campaign contributions for shaping political preferences.
The model could be tested with a data sample for several countries, which would include information about the "institutional regimes" of countries with respect to campaign contributions and their economic performances, especially with respect to investments. If a positive and statistically significant relationship were found between the existences of institutions where overt campaign contributions are permitted and economic efficiency, this would support the model.
The practical significance of the results of this paper is that the existence of such a strong influence of the corporate sector in many countries can be understood under the view of economic efficiency attained with this institution. It must be emphasized that this analysis does not imply that any society should permit unlimited electoral influence of corporate interests. It just gives one argument for the possible economic efficiency of an institution that allows for some influence. The criticisms mentioned in the introduction may well be valid and, depending on the value system of a society, they may weight much more heavily that economic efficiency. Political equality and transparency are two principles that have great importance in their own merit, which should not be judged by their economic consequences.
